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Poverty Traps and Safety Nets 
 
Erik Thorbecke has been a leader among development economists for decades 
and an inspiration to those of us who have had the privilege to work with him and to 
witness his creativity, commitment and industriousness first hand.  The rigor of his 
research on the economics of poverty and nutrition and the relevance of his work to the 
practical concerns of development practitioners and policymakers has distinguished 
Erik’s scholarship from most others’.  It is a great honor to contribute some reflections 
on the economics of poverty traps, nutrition-related health risk and safety nets to this 
event in recognition of Erik’s achievements and contributions to our profession and to 
questions such as those that follow. 
This paper explores three interrelated questions that have been central to Erik’s 
past research and his current concerns1: What is the etiology of chronic poverty and 
vulnerability?  How does nutrition-related health risk affect patterns of chronic poverty 
and vulnerability?  What are the implications for the design of development policy, 
especially safety net interventions?  In recent years, economists have spilled much ink 
over both risk management and poverty analysis.  Yet integration of these topics has 
remained distressingly limited.  Most of the recent empirical development 
microeconomics research on risk has focused on variability in incomes or expenditures, 
the extent to which some portion of that variability might be uninsured among poor 
subpopulations, causing rejection of the neoclassical consumption smoothing 
hypothesis, and the means by which insurance emerges.  Meanwhile, the lion’s share of 
recent poverty analysis has focused on technical issues surrounding its measurement, on 
the relationship between poverty and economic growth, and on poverty dynamics.  In 
this paper, we seek to integrate these two threads explicitly.  
Recent research has begun to point toward an economic rationale – as distinct 
from but complementary to a purely humanitarian rationale – for safety net 
interventions intended to reduce exposure to significant downside risk.2   Protection 
against risk – and perhaps especially against nutrition-related health risk – plays a 
crucial role in stimulating accumulation of productive assets and adoption of improved 
agricultural production technologies, and thus in sparking sustainable growth in 
incomes and reduction in chronic poverty.  When designed and implemented well, social 
                                                 
1 See Thorbecke (2003). 
2 The papers in Dercon (forthcoming) offer perhaps the most complete evidence on and vision of this 
rationale. 
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protection in the form of safety nets can play an important role in stimulating economic 
growth as well as poverty reduction. 
 
 
Chronic Poverty and Poverty Traps 
Increased availability of longitudinal data at household and individual level is 
changing empirical poverty research in ways that affect our understanding of poverty.  
For nearly twenty years, the staple poverty metric has been the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke 
(1984, hereafter FGT) family of decomposable measures encompassing the headcount, 
poverty gap and more distributionally-sensitive measures of poverty within a population.  
FGT measures offer a powerful instrument for poverty analysis, albeit one restricted to 
only a cross-sectional view of poverty.  With advances in data availability and methods, 
poverty researchers are increasingly moving from such static or “snapshot” views of 
poverty to dynamic or “video” perspectives, tracking the path followed by the poor over 
time.  This has led to a variety of important refinements.   
One important refinement arises from the crucial distinction between transitory 
and chronic poverty (Grootaert et al. 1996, Baulch and Hoddinott 2000).  The basic 
concept of chronic poverty is clear – poverty that persists for years, if not lifetimes – 
even if there is some variation across authors in operationalization of the concept, 
sometimes as mean income or expenditures below the poverty line over a time series, 
sometimes as  all or a super-majority of observations below the poverty line.   Whatever 
the precise definition one applies to the data, transitory poverty is plainly shorter-lived 
than chronic poverty.  All else equal, a poor person would far rather experience 
transitory poverty rather than chronic poverty.   
This reveals another dimension – besides familiar FGT headcount and poverty 
gap measures – in which the poverty of developing countries of the South differs 
qualitatively from that of the wealthy countries of the North.  In contrast to the United 
States, where the median time in poverty is 4.5 months (Naifeh, 1998), the median time 
in poverty in rural Bangladesh, Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya or Madagascar is one or more 
lifetimes.  Back-of-the-envelope calculations implied by published data suggest monthly 
exit rates from poverty of 6.9 percent for the United States, meaning nearly 7 percent of 
those who are poor at the beginning of a month will exit poverty by the start of the next 
month.  By contrast, equivalent exit rate estimates based on published panel data studies 
are only 1.3 percent in Côte d’Ivoire and only 0.7 percent for KwaZulu Natal state in 
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South Africa.  Panel data sets we have been assembling in recent years indicate exit rates 
from poverty that are merely 0.6 and 0.4 percent in rural Madagascar and rural Kenya, 
respectively. 3  Although these comparisons are necessarily crude, they nonetheless 
underscore an important qualitative point.  It is not just the magnitude of poverty but, 
perhaps even more importantly, the duration of poverty that differentiates much of the 
developing world from the United States and other wealthy countries. Poverty that 
persists for such long periods of time gives particular salience to the concept of a poverty 
trap, on which we reflect more momentarily.   
The second important recent refinement one finds in the literature is a parallel 
distinction of structural poverty from stochastic poverty.  According to Carter and May 
(1999), the structurally poor lack asset endowments sufficient to generate expected 
income or expenditures above the poverty line, although observed income may exceed 
the poverty line due to random shocks.  The stochastically poor, by contrast, have 
observed income or expenditures below the poverty line even though their asset holdings 
suffice, in expectation, for them to be nonpoor.  This structural-stochastic distinction 
introduces an all-important mapping from income or expenditure measures to asset 
measures which can be subject to less measurement error (Sahn and Stifel 2000) and 
which lend themselves to thinking about poverty dynamics as they relate to asset 
dynamics, which underpin the concept of poverty traps.    
Consider the following stylized examples, drawn from the pastoral setting in the 
arid and semi-arid lands of east Africa on which we will focus later in this chapter.  A  
structurally and chronically poor household might have no livestock or other wealth.  It 
survives by combining low return firewood gathering with transfers from others.  By 
contrast, a stochastically and chronically poor household might have a large enough herd 
to be non-poor, but has suffered from a “string of bad luck” as its female camels 
repeatedly failing to conceive or if they conceive, they spontaneously abort, thus 
                                                 
3 We can derive a back-of-the-envelope estimate of the monthly exit rate using the simple equation Poverty 
ratet = (1- exit rate)t poverty rate0, where t reflects the number of months since the initial observation. With 
only two data points, estimation of the exit rate is merely an arithmetic computation with zero degrees of 
freedom.  With more data, one can estimate the poverty rate econometrically by taking logarithms of both 
sides and applying ordinary least squares, imposing a zero intercept condition.   One should be careful about 
extrapolating beyond the horizon of the sample using this method because it imposes a very simple 
parametric structure.  For example, it does not accommodate rapid dampening of exit rates as time passes.  
The reported back-of-the-envelope calculations are based on transition matrices reported in Grootaert and 
Kanbur (1993) for Côte d’Ivoire (with a poverty line equivalent to $1.12/day per capita), Naifeh (1998) for the 
United States (with a poverty line equivalent to $15.05/day per capita), and Carter and May (1999) for South 
Africa (with a poverty line equivalent to $2.23/day per capita).  The Madagascar data reflect five-year panel 
data from sites in the central and southern highlands (Vakinankaratra and Fianarantsoa, respectively, with a 
poverty line equivalent to $0.50/day per capita).  The northern Kenya data reflect quarterly data over two 
years from six sites (with a poverty line equivalent to $0.50/day per capita). 
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generating neither calves nor milk.  A structurally and transitorily poor household might 
possess a herd size adequate to generate income above the poverty line only during the 
rainy season, but that is insufficient to escape poverty during dry seasons.  Finally, a 
stochastically and transitorily poor household has a herd size large enough to generate 
adequate income, but the camel that provided the majority of the milk production this 
season was killed by a lion and the other camels won’t give birth for another three 
months, leaving the household temporarily deficient.  Intuition suggests strongly that 
these differences matter, that the longer the duration of poverty one experiences and the  
greater the likelihood of experiencing poverty one faces conditional on the stock of 
productive assets one controls, the lower a household’s well being, ceteris paribus.   
The structural-stochastic poverty distinction leads naturally to the third relevant 
recent refinement in the economics of poverty: measurement of household vulnerability 
to poverty.   The crucial insight of this emerging literature is that substantial 
vulnerability to poverty does not imply that people necessarily suffer poverty, just that 
they face real and costly risk, and that they likely behave accordingly.  Studies adopting 
this approach develop vulnerability measures of households’ probability of being poor in 
one period based on observable household characteristics in one or more prior periods 
(Christiansen and Boisvert 2000, Pritchett et al. 2000, Chaudhuri 2001, Christiansen 
and Subbarao 2001, Chaudhuri et al. 2002), perhaps augmented by valuation of the risk 
to which the household is exposed (Ligon and Schechter 2002). Vulnerability measures 
thus incorporate conditional moments beyond the mean, establishing the conditional 
probability of falling below a poverty line, the cost of uncertain welfare, or both.  In 
terms of our pastoral example above, of two households with identical expected incomes, 
one holding camels and the other holding cattle that exhibit more variable productivity 
than camels, the latter would have a higher probability of being poor in the future and 
thus would have a higher vulnerability measure.    
Chronic and structural poverty or chronic vulnerability to poverty raise the 
prospect of poverty traps.  The pivotal feature of poverty traps is the existence of one or 
more critical wealth thresholds that people have a difficult time crossing from below. 
Above the threshold, growth takes people toward a high-productivity steady state where 
they are non-poor and, at most, only moderately vulnerable to poverty, while below the 
threshold, people sink toward a low-productivity poverty trap characterized by frequent, 
if not constant, spells of poverty and high vulnerability to being poor in the future from 
which escape is difficult.  The threshold is the point at which expected path dynamics 
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bifurcate,  i.e., where the time derivate of expected wealth changes sign.  Poverty traps 
thus imply the existence of multiple dynamic equilibria. 
Longstanding hypotheses about multiple dynamic equilibria are receiving 
renewed attention in the economics literature.4  Highly suggestive empirical evidence is 
now emerging that indeed Myrdal, Nurkse, Rosenstein-Rodan and Young may have been 
correct about the existence of distinct accumulation trajectories, one or more of which 
lead to what we have termed poverty traps.5  Further theoretical and empirical findings 
on the causes and consequences of multiple dynamic equilibria and their relationship to 
poverty traps offers the potential for improved development policy to diminish the 
prevalence of such traps  In particular, empirical corroboration of the existence of 
poverty traps -- bifurcations in expected asset accumulation patterns as reflected in 
thresholds defined on current period asset holdings – would signal the necessity of 
renewed activism by donors and governments to address insufficiency of asset holdings 
and financial markets access among the chronic poor.  
The idea of poverty traps and multiple dynamic equilibria ultimately hinges on 
initial conditions, in particular on the stock of productive assets one possesses and the 
productivity of those assets.  Asset poverty thus plays a central role in understanding 
poverty as it is more commonly measured using income or expenditure data.   
If asset holdings underpin poverty status, then asset dynamics underpin poverty 
dynamics.  We can therefore get a reasonably good first answer to the question of “do 
there exist multiple dynamic equilibria associated with poverty traps?” by studying asset 
dynamics and looking for multiple dynamic equilibria in asset space.  The central role 
asset holdings play in generating income and expenditure patterns, and that asset 
dynamics play in welfare dynamics more broadly, underscores a fundamental weakness 
of the canonical consumption smoothing model.  The canonical version of the permanent 
income hypothesis, dating back to Friedman (1957), from whence predictions of 
consumption smoothing originate, rests on the crucial assumption that stochastic 
income draws are independent and identically distributed (iid) across time.  That might 
be true if risk were purely associated with the returns on a intertemporally fixed set of 
assets.  As soon as one allows for asset risk, however, then the iid assumption regarding 
stochastic income necessarily falls.   If asset shocks have any persistence from one period 
                                                 
4 See Loury (1981), Romer (1986), Lucas (1988), Azariadis and Drazen (1990), Banerjee and Newman (1993),  
Galor and Zeira (1993), Durlauf (1996), Hoff and Sen (2002) and Mookherjee and Ray (2002).  
5 See, for example, Dercon (1998), Barrett et al. (2001), Carter and May (2001) Lybbert et al. (2002), Dercon 
and Hoddinott (forthcoming). 
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to the next – for example, anything beyond very short term illness with no lasting effects 
–and income is a function of assets, then income draws are not iid.  Rather, they will be 
strongly, positively autocorrelated at a minimum.  More likely, the  conditional 
distribution of income will shift over periods in response to changes in the underlying 
stock of productive assets. As a consequence, consumption does not follow a martingale 
process, rather it depends on (at least) wealth (Deaton 1992, Bhargava and Ravallion 
1993). People know that and behave accordingly. 
We briefly explore the issue of asset dynamics among a poor population using 
data collected quarterly from March 2000-December 2001 among 177 pastoralist 
households in six sites in the arid and semi-arid lands of northern Kenya. 6  The primary 
nonhuman assets held by pastoralists are their herds of livestock.  The relationship 
between herd size, measured in tropical livestock units (TLU),7 and daily per capita 
income is strong and monotonically increasing, as depicted in Figure 1.  Bigger herds 
generate a greater flow of milk, the primary source of income (in kind and cash) in the 
east African rangelands.8  Interestingly, the simple bivariate nonparametric kernel 
regression depicted in Figure 1 suggests that per capita daily income is convex in per 
capita TLU holdings over most of the data range (the density of household livestock 
holdings is also plotted, against the righthand axis).   This corroborates prior conjectures 
of endogenously increasing rates of expected return on assets (McPeak and Barrett 
                                                 
6 The survey methods and data are described in detail in (Add codebook citation) 
7 Tropical livestock units (TLU) standardize animals by species mean live weight, permitting aggregation 
across species and thus herd size comparisons across agroecologically dissimilar areas between which 
prevailing species herd composition vary. The standard weighting system, used here, is 1 TLU= 1 cattle = 0.7 
camels = 10 goats = 11 sheep.   
8 Expenditures follow a similarly shaped pattern, so this result is not specific to the welfare indicator used. 
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2001).  While this merits further exploration controlling for additional covariates, this 
finding suggests that income may increase at more than a one-for-one rate as wealth 
increases, at least over the upper portion of the wealth distribution.  Indeed, the points at 
which expected change in income seems to increase with additional livestock holdings 
correspond reasonably well with rules of thumb common in the multidisciplinary 
literature on pastoralism, which points to a mobility threshold of 4-5 TLU/person below 
which households are typically unable to engage in long-distance trekking to take 
advantage of spatiotemporal variability in forage and water availability, and an 
invulnerability-to-immobility threshold at 9-12 TLU per capita.  This interval 
corresponds precisely with the primary range of apparent convexity in the income-herd 
size relationship shown.  Of course, relatively few households are able to take advantage 
of this.   
 The strong, seemingly convex relationship between assets and income raises a 
natural question about asset dynamics: who can expect to enjoy growth in herd sizes and 
thus even more rapid growth in incomes?  Figure 2 offers an example of asset dynamics 
characterized by multiple equilibria in our Kenyan data.  The black 45-degree line in 
Figure 2 represents dynamic equilibria, where expected future herd size equals current 
herd size.   Observations that lie above the 45-degree line indicate growth in asset stock 
over time; observations below it reflect asset decumulation.  Most households cluster 
around the 45-degree line, enjoying a stable herd size in both one quarter (blue solid 
line) and one year (red dashed line) transitions.  Consequently, the conditional median 
(not shown) – as distinct from the conditional means depicted in the solid lines – tracks 
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Figure 2: Herd Dynamics in Northern Kenya
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the 45-degree line through most of the data.  But herd collapse is far more common than 
rapid herd growth, as reflected in the noticeably greater density of points below the 45-
degree line than above it.  The herd collapse recorded in the data largely reflects livestock 
losses that occurred during the first half of the study period due to a widespread drought 
in northern Kenya.   Importantly, the results suggest an asymmetry in asset risk.  The 
asymmetry in asset risk is illustrated by the expected herd dynamics, which show a clear 
S-shaped pattern, based on the nonparametric kernel regression of future herd size on 
current period herd size at both 3-month (quarter) and 12-month (year) leads.  This 
pattern is very similar to that Lybbert et al. (forthcoming) find using 17-year herd 
histories from a qualitatively similar system in neighboring southern Ethiopia.  
These asset dynamics reveal multiple dynamic equilibria.  Stable equilibria 
appear at approximately 1 and 17-18 TLU per capita, with an unstable equilibrium 
around 12-13 TLU per capita, a bit above – although not statistically significantly 
different from – the 9-12 TLU/person invulnerability-to-immobility threshold 
mentioned earlier.  The unstable equilibrium reflects a critical threshold. Herd sizes that 
reach or exceed the threshold will, on average, grow to the higher, stable equilibrium 
herd size, which yields expected per capita daily income of roughly US$1.50/day (see 
Figure 1).  But only about one percent of our sample attains this high-level equilibrium.  
When herd sizes fall below the threshold level of 12-14 head, future per capita herd sizes 
steadily decrease in expectation, to the point where per capita herd sizes and expected 
daily per capita income are only about 1 TLU and $0.25, respectively.  The herd size 
distribution reflected in Figure 1 suggests that few northern Kenyan pastoralists are able 
to surmount that critical threshold to reach the high, stable dynamic equilibrium.  
Instead, most people find themselves trapped in extreme poverty.   
People can be trapped either because they are born into extreme poverty and 
have a difficult time accumulating assets or because they suffer significant shocks that 
cast them below the critical threshold point before they are able to accumulate enough of 
a herd to cross the threshold, as in Dercon (1998).  Because stochastic asset shocks play a 
central role in understanding why pastoralists routinely suffer accumulation failures, 
asset risk is central to a solid understanding of poverty dynamics in an environment such 
as northern Kenya, where frequent droughts, violent cattle raids and human disease 
epidemics confront pastoralists with extraordinarily great risk of asset loss (McPeak and 
Barrett 2001, Smith et al. 2001).   
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Human Capital, Subsistence Constraints and Poverty Traps 
The preceding discussion and evidence help to illustrate the concepts of poverty 
traps and of critical thresholds in asset space, with a specific application to livestock, the 
primary non-human asset of east African pastoralists.  This same intuition regarding the 
monotone (and potentially convex) relation between assets and flow measures of welfare 
(e.g., expenditures or income) and the possible existence of S-shaped asset dynamics 
carries over to other key productive assets.   
The assets of perhaps greatest relevance to poverty analysis are those embodied 
in people: human capital.  In this section we therefore reflect on how human capital as 
represented by health status can be viewed as another asset that can be used to 
conceptualize what distinguishes the poor from the non-poor.  We focus especially on 
how health risk, especially nutrition-related health risk that threatens human capital, 
can affect accumulation and risk management patterns and can lead households into a 
poverty trap.   
No asset risk more threatens human livelihoods than health risk for the simple 
reason that human capital is the most valuable asset among the poor, for at least two 
reasons.  First, the poor commonly own little other than their labor power, lacking land, 
livestock, and significant financial or physical assets.  Their livelihoods depend almost 
entirely on wage earnings and transfers.  Physical capacity to work underpins their 
livelihoods.  Hence the importance of good health and nutrition, quite apart from their 
intrinsic value.   
The second reason for human capital’s inordinate importance arises from its 
complementarity with other productive assets.  Few assets yield returns without some 
complementary input of labor.  Even the most fertile soils yield no crops without 
planting and harvest labor and the most productive livestock give no milk without labor.  
Hence the notion of Lockean property rights, that by mixing one’s labor with land (or 
any other latent but previously unexploited resource), it transforms the resource into a 
productive asset.  When human capital is diminished by health or nutrition shocks, the 
poor’s livelihood systems are at least threatened, and commonly degraded. 
Furthermore, the risk associated with human capital also differs somewhat from 
other asset risk in that human capital is among the only assets subject to important 
irreversibilities.9  A household can lose its herd or its land and yet remain able to 
                                                 
9 See Gersovitz (1983), Dasgupta (1993, 1997), Glomm and Palumbo (1993), Dasgupta (1997), Chavas 
(2000), Barrett (2002) and Zimmerman and Carter (2003) for richer discussions of the problems associated 
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reconstitute a herd or secure access to new land in time.  But while many health shocks 
are mild and quickly overcome in time, similar recovery of human capital losses is often 
impossible in the wake of permanent physical disability or acute illness (e.g., blindness, 
accidental loss of limbs or brain damage, cretinism due to iodine deficiency), much less 
death.  The irreversibility of some types of health shocks creates an especially salient 
critical threshold in asset space – akin to a subsistence constraint – that has a profound 
effect on welfare dynamics.  Future asset stocks and income flows may depend on 
current consumption, at least for certain populations near critical morbidity or mortality 
thresholds.  
Although most of the risk management literature has focused on income risk and 
the use of asset stocks to buffer consumption against stochastic income, an important 
subliterature addresses the somewhat more complex problems associated with asset risk 
among poor populations (Dercon 1998, Carter and May 2001, Zimmerman and Carter 
2003, McPeak 2004, Lybbert et al. forthcoming).  Economists have long appreciated that 
asset risk influences consumption and accumulation patterns because future income is 
endogenous to current asset shocks and subsequent consumption choices (Phelps 1962, 
Levhari and Srinivasan 1969, Sandmo 1969, 1970).  When income shocks and asset 
shocks occur contemporaneously (e.g., poor rainfall causes non-lactating animals to die 
but also causes a reduction in milk production by currently lactating animals), then 
forward-looking agents will balance familiar consumption smoothing behaviors 
associated with agents’ desire to equalize the discounted expected utility of consumption 
across periods – taking income as given – with asset smoothing behaviors arising from 
an inextricable desire to smooth expected income across periods.  As a consequence, 
household consumption over time will tend to be relatively more volatile (i.e., less 
smoothed) in communities where asset risk is greater. 
As the coping strategies literature makes abundantly clear, very poor populations 
will liquidate virtually any asset – even sell themselves or their children into slavery – 
when they might otherwise cross beneath a critical nutritional threshold, a point where 
they run intolerable risk of permanent impairment due to injury or illness (sometimes 
referred to in the dynamics literature as an “absorbing state”).  Yet the poor will also vary 
consumption dramatically above that threshold in an effort to protect productive assets 
essential to minimizing nutrition-related health risk in future periods, typically reducing 
food consumption as a first line of defense against long-term asset loss (Maxwell 1995, 
                                                                                                                                                 
with undernutrition and irreversibilities (i.e., absorbing states and other forms of hysteresis) in human 
health dynamics and resulting intertemporally nonseparable preferences. 
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Barrett 2002).  In sum, in the face of asset risk, the very poor may destabilize 
consumption – while being careful not to cross the subsistence threshold in the current 
period – so as to defend their productive asset stock and thereby maximize the 
probability of future survival. 
We can return to the pastoral example to illustrate the dilemma facing poor 
households in the face of asset shocks.  Herders near a critical herd size threshold  
become very reluctant to liquidate livestock to support current period consumption.  
They understand the potentially devastating long term implications of slipping below the 
livestock asset threshold.  However, failure to liquidate assets can lead to a consumption 
crisis.  This occurs because the effort to guarantee future consumption comes at the 
expense of current period consumption thus increasing the possibility of malnutrition- 
related health risks.   This requires a delicate balancing act to reduce current period 
consumption enough to ensure livestock assets are sufficient in the future, but not so 
much as to jeopardize human capital sufficiency in the future.  That balancing act may 
not be possible given the constraints faced by the poor.   It can also lead to great 
consumption volatility among the most vulnerable subpopulations. 
Consumption instability is especially worrisome among the world’s poor because 
severe (macro- or micro-nutrient) undernutrition is strongly and causally associated 
with acute health shocks and because the poor depend disproportionately on labor 
earnings for their livelihoods.  Ill health is both cause and consequence of extreme 
poverty.  As people become poor, they become more likely to suffer serious illnesses and 
injuries and such illnesses and injuries aggravate pre-existing poverty.  This bidirectional 
causality lies at the heart of the literature on nutritional efficiency wages.10  
One source of low exit rates from poverty originates in this bidirectional 
causality.  Over a long period of time, it can even lead to the intergenerational 
transmission of poverty, as parents’ income is positively related to children’s nutrient 
intake and likelihood of receiving immunizations and other preventive and curative 
health care, and early childhood episodes of illness and undernutrition have persistent 
effects on stature and cognitive development that significantly affect expected lifetime 
earnings (Dasgupta 1997, Strauss and Thomas 1997, Martorell 1999, Glewwe et al. 2001, 
                                                 
10 Liebenstein (1957) first emphasized the economic importance of food biochemistry for labor productivity. 
See Dasgupta and Ray (1986, 1987), Dasgupta (1993), Ray and Streufert (1993), and Dasgupta (1997) for 
clear explanations of the details of the nutritional efficiency wage hypothesis and its relationship to poverty 
traps.   Criticisms of this hypothesis include Bliss and Stern (1978), Rosenzweig (1988), and Strauss and 
Thomas (1995). 
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Hoddinott and Kinsey 2001, Gertler and Gruber 2002, Dercon and Hoddinott 
forthcoming) .  
The fact that serious health shocks – many of which are causally related to 
undernutrition – cannot be fully insured and thus can have significant and persistent 
effects is fairly intuitive.  But health and nutrition shocks matter not only because of 
their ex post impact when they do occur but, of broader relevance, because people adapt 
their livelihood strategies in response to their assessment of the risks they face under 
alternative strategies.  As we discussed above, vulnerability to future poverty is as 
important to understand as current and past poverty.  People optimally manage assets 
and consumption with an eye toward the effects on future human capital stock, not just 
to equalize expected utility of current consumption over time.  The resulting behaviors 
may sometimes appear as if agents are making intertemporal resource allocation 
decisions subject to a subsistence constraint, i.e., as if consumption is constrained not to 
fall below some threshold level in any period.  The term “subsistence constraint” 
nonetheless lends itself to misinterpretation.  It is less a strict physiological constraint – 
human basal metabolism appears extraordinarily adaptable in terms of energy 
consumption, albeit not with respect to most micronutrients – than an endogenous 
behavioral pattern caused by the persistence of shocks to human capital, thus leading to 
stochastic income draws that are not independent and identically distributed across 
time, undercutting the standard Friedmanite model of consumption smoothing.  
Household decisions made in response to their perceived vulnerability to health shocks 
have important implications for well being over time. In particular, ex ante health and 
nutritional risk mitigation strategies can have a profound effect on accumulation 
patterns.   This happens in at least two different ways. 
First, peoples’ risk preferences affect their choice of activity and consumption 
patterns.  If decreasing absolute risk aversion best describes risk preferences, as the bulk 
of the relevant literature suggests, then the poor will tend to pay more to reduce risk 
exposure than will the rich.  Such payments typically come in the form of foregone 
earnings.  For example, Binswanger and Rosenzweig (1993) found that a one standard 
deviation increase in weather risk induces Indian households of median wealth to reduce 
expected farm profits by an estimated 15 percent, while household in the bottom quartile 
reduce expected farm profits by 35 percent.  The wealthiest quartile households, on the 
other hand, have adequate independent risk coping mechanisms, so they adjust input 
use patterns hardly at all to increased exogenous risk.  Carter (1997) estimated 
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household willingness to pay for certain food availability in Burkina Faso at better than 
twenty percent.  He found that the cost of incomplete self-insurance seemed to be on the 
order of ten percent or more of income. Several recent studies – notably Elbers and 
Gunning (2003) and Wood (2003) – similarly observe that households can trap 
themselves in chronic poverty through their rational approach to risk management.  
Second, the effects of health and nutritional risk on behavior and welfare 
dynamics may come not through risk preferences per se, but through awareness of and 
behavioral response to the existence of critical  thresholds in human capital space 
associated with irreversibilities in physical functioning.   As a direct consequence of the 
absorbing states associated with irreversible health shocks, the poor may forego high-
return investments that would demand greater short-term sacrifices in consumption 
than they dare undertake for fear of coming too near the threshold of permanent (or 
near-permanent) health shocks. For example, Zimmerman and Carter (2003) 
demonstrate how uninsurable asset risk leads poor people to hold highly unproductive 
asset portfolios.  In a similar spirit, Moser and Barrett (2003) demonstrate the 
importance of subsistence constraints in explaining nonadoption of a high-yielding, low-
input method of rice production in Madagascar.    
The presence de facto subsistence constraints associated with irreversible health 
shocks causes important interhousehold variation in risk management behavior. In 
particular, while the poor will still tend to smooth income more than the rich – due to 
risk averse preferences and financial barriers to entry into high return/high risk 
activities – they will also tend to smooth consumption less, relative to their income, than 
do the rich, choosing instead to buffer productive assets on which future well-being 
depends as a strategy for staying away from the perilous threshold of permanent 
impairment.  The threat of irreversible human capital loss tends to induce generalized 
asset smoothing – as distinct from consumption smoothing – among those near 
subsistence thresholds, as the poor aim to protect critical resources as a bulwark against 
future nutrition-related health risk.   
Figure 3 demonstrates this point empirically, plotting the nonparametric kernel 
regression of the coefficient of variation (CV) for both income and expenditures – 
computed from the quarterly panel data observations  from our 177 northern Kenyan 
households – on initial period household herd size.   The positive correlation between 
wealth and income risk is apparent in the upward slope of the blue, dashed line depicting 
income CV.  The gap between the income CV regression line and the (red, solid) 
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expenditure CV regression line reflects consumption smoothing behavior.  While richer 
households take on greater income risk than poorer households do, the rich nonetheless 
enjoy lower intertemporal variability in expenditures.  Consumption smoothing is a 
normal good, increasing in wealth in spite of prospectively greater absolute risk aversion 
among the poor. This occurs precisely because of the threat posed by nutrition-related 
health risk.  Among the poorest households, intertemporal income variability is actually 
less than expenditure volatility, signaling that the most vulnerable households will 
destabilize consumption in order to protect crucial productive assets on which their 
future survival will depend.     
In summary, the existence of critical irreversibilities in human capital dynamics 
— generating multiple equilibria similar to the S-shaped asset dynamics shown 
previously for livestock in northern Kenyan pastoralist households – affects household 
risk management. Because households know that health and nutrition shocks occur with 
positive probability that is a function of current allocation decisions and that some asset 
shocks are irreversible, they adapt their behaviors accordingly, choosing activity and 
asset portfolios that limit income risk, foregoing high-return investments that would 
demand significant short-term sacrifice beyond what is prudent and safe, and willingly 
destabilizing consumption in order to protect assets so as to minimize the probability of 
suffering irreversible health or nutrition shocks the next period.  Beyond some threshold 
level of asset holdings, they can begin to afford to undertake higher risk and higher 
return livelihood strategies, leading to locally increasing returns to assets such as those 
depicted in Figure 1. 
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The existence of significant asset risk leads directly to the strongest economic 
rationale for safety nets.  The fact that many shocks – especially serious health shocks, 
many of which are causally related to undernutrition – cannot be fully insured and thus 
have significant and persistent effects is fairly intuitive.  This provides the prevailing 
humanitarian rationale for interventions, based on what is commonly termed a “rights-
based approach” enshrined in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Article 
25) and the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
(Article 11) and reaffirmed at the 1996 World Food Summit and the follow-on summit 
held in 2001.  Unmet demand for ex post recovery assistance also provides one 
important economic rationale for publicly-provided safety nets in the form of emergency 
food assistance, employment guarantee schemes, and publicly funded health care for the 
indigent.   
We want to pursue a slightly different, supplementary tack in arguing the 
economic rationale for safety nets.   The poor tend to be much more exposed than the 
rich are to asset risk and thus face a higher probability of being cast below critical 
thresholds due to adverse shocks caused, for example, by drought, floods, hurricanes, 
epidemics or war. 11 In the absence of effective safety nets, people routinely fall not only 
into poverty, but beyond critical asset thresholds and into chronic poverty.   Effective 
safety net programs can generate significant indirect benefits by reducing vulnerable 
peoples’ need to mitigate downside risk through costly portfolio management and 
activity choice or to sell off scarce productive assets when current earned income 
shortfalls are so serious that they would otherwise suffer irreversible health effects.   
Development policy has long focused on structural interventions intended to 
increase the poor’s asset holdings through direct transfers, public health and education 
services, land reform or other such redistributive programs.  Such policies may indeed be 
necessary to assist many of the chronically poor (Barrett forthcoming).  There exists no 
good evidence of which we are aware, however, as to the relative poverty reduction 
effectiveness of direct efforts to build up the assets of the poor through redistributive 
transfers, as compared to indirect efforts to induce endogenous asset accumulation by 
the poor through reduced exposure to downside asset risk.  This is an interesting and 
                                                 
11 At the aggregate level, IFRCRCS (2002) reports that more than 98 percent of the people affected by 
different types of environmental (e.g., droughts, earthquakes, floods, avalanches) and technological (e.g., 
industrial or transport accidents) disasters worldwide, 1992-2001, lived in low and medium human 
development nations.  Although airline crashes in the United States and deaths from severe heat waves in 
France capture the headlines, the overwhelming majority of shocks are experienced in the developing 
world. 
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important question that rigorous, policy-oriented researchers in the Thorbecke tradition 
might usefully tackle.   
The issues is not only the relative effectiveness of alternative types of 
interventions.12  Redistributive programs may only be effective in achieving sustainable, 
long-term reductions in chronic poverty when complemented by safety nets. Moreover, 
absent effective safety nets, redistributive policies to build up the poor’s asset holdings 
may prove rather like opening the drain on a tub with the faucet still running.  Many 
people may exit chronic poverty due to pro-poor transfer policies, but new ones will 
enter chronic poverty just as quickly in the absence of effective safety nets and 
households teetering on the edge of chronic poverty will choose risk management 
strategies that predictably fail to stimulate asset and income growth.  At a minimum, 
effective safety nets should block pathways into poverty.  
Moreover, the knowledge that such safety nets exist may allow some households 
to move out of poverty due to behavioral changes that come about in response to 
reducing the risk of crossing some critical asset threshold. When financial markets fail 
and people cannot borrow to trade consumption between periods or contract for 
insurance against adverse shocks, the financial market failure gets displaced into 
exaggerated activity in some other area(s), causing costly allocative inefficiencies that 
retard asset accumulation and income growth.  If safety nets can effectively truncate the 
lower tail of the distributions faced by households such that they no longer need to worry 
about a brief shock having calamitous, permanent consequences, then we should observe 
poor people undertaking more high-return investments that require short-term sacrifice, 
a reallocation of portfolios away from safer, lower-return assets and towards higher-
yielding assets and activities, and reduced asset smoothing behavior.   These are 
important, open, empirical questions as to whether safety nets can provide a pathway out 
of poverty for those whose endogenous risk management strategies leave them 
chronically poor.13     
But safety nets can only generate desirable poverty reduction benefits if they are 
credible.  Poor people must believe that a promised safety net will indeed be available 
when needed and that it will function as promised.  Otherwise, they will not reduce their 
practice of costly risk mitigation strategies that contribute to chronic poverty.   
                                                 
12 Barrett (forthcoming) presents a simple formulation of income dynamics and draws a useful distinction 
between “cargo net” and “safety net” interventions intended to address different sources of intertemporal 
variability in welfare.  The differences between alternative policies are developed in more detail there. 
13 It is also critically important to identify and mitigate any adverse incentives that may result from the 
implementation of such safety nets. 
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The crucial issue here is targeting.  Targeting concerns the who, the when, the 
what and the how questions surrounding transfers: is aid reaching people who need it 
(and not flowing to people who do not need it), when they need it, in appropriate form, 
and through effective modalities.  All real world transfer programs suffer targeting errors 
for the simple reasons that (i) information is costly to collect and to process, (ii) it is 
impossible to have perfect information about all people at all times (i.e., to know who is 
and is not needy) and (iii) actual allocations are made for multiple reasons, only one of 
which is objective need (Barrett and Maxwell forthcoming).  Especially where means-
based screening of prospective beneficiaries proves administratively infeasible – as is 
true in most low-income countries – then intra-community heterogeneity and factor 
market failures tend to generate significant errors of inclusion even in self-targeting 
program designs (Barrett and Clay 2003).  Because a safety net program without 
targeting errors is practically infeasible, there exists a difficult tradeoff between wasteful 
and distortionary errors of inclusion and potentially damaging errors of exclusion.  
There’s no clearly superior direction in which to err. The difficulty of this tradeoff makes 
minimization of targeting errors essential (Barrett and Maxwell forthcoming) 
In the northern Kenyan communities we study, food aid provides the primary (in 
many cases, the only) safety net.  In northern Kenya, food aid responds to rainfall 
shocks.  When period-average rainfall across a large area drops, food aid shipments 
begin.  So food aid responds to climate shocks.  While rainfall indeed has a major effect 
on asset and welfare dynamics in the rangelands of the Horn of Africa, the effects are 
more subtle than is commonly acknowledged.  First, there is considerable microclimatic 
variability.  Some areas may get just enough rain at just the right time that they suffer no 
serious loss of water or forage during a “drought”.   Relief agencies commonly fail to take 
such microvariability into consideration in geographic targeting of food aid.  Second, 
agents vary markedly in their capacity to manage common rainfall shocks –  either ex 
ante, through mitigation efforts, or ex post through coping strategies – and thus asset 
risk appears to be overwhelming idiosyncratic (i.e., household-specific) rather than 
covariate (McPeak and Barrett 2001, Smith et al. 2001, Lybbert et al. forthcoming).  
Because asset dynamics are less closely correlated across households than is often 
assumed, safety net interventions such as food aid distribution that respond to aggregate 
shocks necessarily introduce considerable errors of both exclusion (e.g., leaving out 
people suffering serious shocks outside of drought periods) and inclusion, as depicted 
clearly in Figure 4.  Third, when aggregate shocks do cause asset loss due, for example, to 
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herd die-offs, the income shock is persistent, dampening only if and as herds recover.  
But for the nontrivial minority who lose their herds completely, or who suddenly fall 
below the critical mobility threshold, the shock may be nonstationary, in which case food 
aid as a short-term palliative fails to match the long-term needs for an alternative 
livelihood.   
It is useful for the moment to return to the original stylized discussion used to 
illustrate different definitions of poverty.  Food aid provides temporary assistance to the 
chronically and structurally poor household that had no animals, but offers nothing in 
the way of a safety net to prevent falling into poverty or an escape route from poverty for 
this group.  For a chronically but only stochastically household, food aid may provide 
some temporary assistance that helps ride out the string of bad luck that the household is 
suffering, but does little to either prevent or address the situation, and only helps if the 
food aid that is triggered by a covariate crisis happens to fall in the same periods as the 
run of bad luck experienced at the household level.  A household that is structurally and 
transitorily poor may find food aid helps them from falling from seasonally into chronic 
poverty, but will still require assistance in their effort to escape structural poverty.  The 
group most clearly helped by a food aid program is the stochastically and transitorily 
poor – the rainfall crisis is a stochastic event, and the goal of food aid is to allow these 
households to ride out the food availability crisis without having to draw on their asset 
base (both livestock capital and human capital) in ways which will push them across 
some critical threshold.   
In our sample, every household received food aid in at least one quarter, 2000-
2001, a period beginning in the midst of one of the worst droughts to hit the region in a 
generation.14  Yet in spite of ubiquitous participation and a severe drought, the median 
share of total household income represented by food aid was merely 0.7% and only 1.0% 
of households received at least 10.0% of total household income in the form of food aid.   
                                                 
14 For example, in our three most arid sites (Kargi, Logologo and North Horr, respectively), cumulative 
rainfall between May 1999 and September 2000 was only 38-63 millimeters.  The other three, semi-arid 
sites (Dirib Gombo, N’gambo and Suguta Marmar) had significantly higher total precipitation, but still well 
below annual or seasonal averages. 
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Figure 4 shows the nonparametric kernel regressions of the probability of 
receiving food aid (blue thicker quasi-horizontal line) and of the monetary value of food 
aid receipts (red, thinner quasi-horizontal line)  on household earned income15 over a 
three-month period, as well as the density of household earned income (black, thinner 
curve).  There was no appreciable difference across the income distribution in either the 
likelihood of receiving food aid in a given quarter nor of the value received.  If anything, 
households with very high earned income were more likely than those with low earned 
incomes to receive food aid and their expected food aid receipts were somewhat higher 
than those received by the poorest households.  These findings echo evidence reported 
recently from Ethiopia that similarly show food aid going to the rich with at least the 
same frequency and at nearly the same rate as to the poor (Clay et al. 1999, Jayne et al. 
2001).  In spite of massive shipments into the region and widespread concerns that 
pastoralists suffer food aid “dependency”, the resource is distributed “a mile wide and an 
inch deep”, as one NGO official described it to us recently, so broadly as to become  
ineffective in truncating downside risk faced by pastoralists.  As a consequence, the 
safety net fails to provide necessary insurance against downside risk and pastoralists 
engage in costly self-insurance through herd overstocking, restricted mobility, etc. 
(McPeak and Barrett 2001, Lybbert et al. forthcoming). 
Conceptually, safety nets can play an extremely valuable role in mitigating asset 
risk, in keeping short-term shocks from leading to chronic poverty through endogenous 
asset decumulation or low-return production and portfolio strategies.  There are 
                                                 
15 The conditioning variable here is earned income (that is, excluding transfers). By way of reference, 
median quarterly income is just over KSh8700, the top quintile had quarterly income of KSh23500 or 
greater and the top five percent earned KSh50000 or more. 
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examples of safety net schemes that seem to work, perhaps especially those based on 
public employment guarantees.16   But as presently designed and implemented, food aid 
based safety nets appear largely ineffective in either preventing people from falling into 
poverty traps or at lifting people out of poverty traps in places like northern Kenya.  In 
addition, the amount of aid delivered does not appear to be particularly credible as a 
means to induce behavioral change that will help households grow themselves out of 
extreme poverty.  Food aid may indeed contribute to better consumption outcomes and 
anthropometric status (Dercon and Krishnan 2003, Quisumbing 2003), but it largely 
fails to help move recipients out of chronic poverty.  
 
 
Conclusions  
 In this chapter we have tried to outline the integration of risk management and 
poverty reduction issues, focusing especially on how the experience of and exposure to 
asset risk may trap certain households in chronic poverty and vulnerability.  If there exist 
multiple dynamic equilibria of the sort conjectured by classical development theorists 
such as Myrdal, Nurkse, Rosenstein-Rodan and Young, then even minor perturbations to 
individual asset stocks and the prospect of significant, if transitory, income shortfalls can 
both have lasting welfare effects on subpopulations with limited initial endowments and 
scant or no access to credit and insurance.  Drawing on original, high-frequency panel 
data from very poor pastoralist communities in northern Kenya, we find suggestive 
evidence both of multiple dynamic equilibria consistent with the hypothesis of poverty 
traps and of risk management patterns consistent with the notion that risk exposure and 
experience may play a significant role in trapping such populations in chronic poverty 
and vulnerability.  
The normative prescriptions of minimalist neoclassical models generally fail in 
the presence of risk and uncertainty, especially where insurance market failures are 
compounded by credit market failures, so that people are unable to move consumption 
across periods in response to transitory shocks to assets or incomes, and where 
important irreversibilities break down intertemporal separability, thereby affecting risk 
management and asset and welfare dynamics.  As a consequence, there exists a real 
public role in risk management for the poor (Ahmad et al. 1991, Dercon forthcoming).   
                                                 
16 See Ravallion (1991, 1999), Ravallion et al. (1993), Besley and Coate (1992) and von Braun (1995) for 
detailed descriptions of the theory and evidence on public employment guarantee (“workfare”) schemes.  
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Credible and ubiquitous safety nets can both (i) respect the human right to food 
and (ii) reduce downside risk, thereby inducing portfolio reallocation, raising the real 
prospect of income growth through capital accumulation and new technology adoption 
and market participation.  In theory, effective safety nets can enlarge the basin of 
attraction toward higher dynamic equilibria and reduced vulnerability.  For most of the 
poor, the key safety net lies in nutrition and health space because their most important 
irreversible asset is their human capital.   The need for high frequency consumption to 
maintain health can necessitate asset divestiture in the face of sharp, transitory income 
shocks, causing short-lived shocks to have persistent, if not irreversible, effects.  
Moreover, awareness of crucial thresholds affects risk management, causing the poor to 
choose low-return production strategies and asset portfolios that merely reinforce their 
chronic poverty and vulnerability. Unfortunately, the record of safety net provision has 
been checkered,  so we have limited empirical evidence as to how effective in practice 
safety nets can be in inducing the poor to choose higher-return livelihood strategies.  
This is an area ripe for intensive research. 
New research in this area will need to take seriously, however, the centrality of 
asset risk – not just income risk – to chronic poverty and vulnerability.  In particular, 
researchers need to start thinking about vulnerability relative to critical thresholds, not 
only relative to (inherently arbitrary) poverty lines.  There’s great inertia behind the use 
of poverty lines, but this doesn’t seem like the most fruitful way to proceed.  We need to 
begin establishing whether critical thresholds indeed exist and, if they do, to identify 
them with sufficient precision so that we can locate the appropriate level and trigger for 
safety nets. Because the key vulnerability is less with respect to a poverty line (although 
that is certainly important and informative) than with respect to the points at which 
welfare dynamics birfucate, research needs to focus on increasingly on these dynamics 
and on how to implement effective, credible safety nets to keep people from falling into 
chronic poverty. 
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